

## Dynasty Politics in Indonesia: A Critical Analysis from the Perspective of *Maqasid al-Shari'ah* Abdullah bin Bayyah

Muhammad Anang Ramadion<sup>1\*</sup>, Raja Habib Luthfi<sup>2</sup>, Hafidz Iman<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Faculty of Islamic Studies, Islamic University of Indonesia, 55581, Indonesia

<sup>2</sup>Faculty of Law, Islamic University of Indonesia, 55581, Indonesia

<sup>3</sup>Faculty of Philosophy, Gajah Mada University, 55281, Indonesia

Corresponding author's email: 21421046@students.uui.ac.id

### Abstract

The phenomenon of dynastic politics in Indonesia presents a serious challenge to the consolidation of democracy and the implementation of constitutionalism. The practice of power inheritance based on kinship undermines meritocracy, weakens the quality of governance, and erodes public trust in democratic institutions. Although dynastic politics does not explicitly violate positive law, from the perspective of Islamic political ethics it contradicts the values of justice and public trust (*amānah*). This study critically analyzes the phenomenon of dynastic politics in Indonesia through the lens of *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah* as conceptualized by Abdullah bin Bayyah. Employing a qualitative approach with library research methods, this paper explores Bin Bayyah's view of *maqāṣid* as the "soul of jurisprudence," emphasizing public welfare (*al-maṣlahah al-'āmmah*), justice (*al-'adl*), competence (*al-kafā'ah*), and social reform (*iṣlāḥ*). The analysis reveals that dynastic politics tends to generate social inequality, undermine substantive justice, and deviate from the *maqāṣid*-oriented governance that seeks public welfare and moral integrity. In Bin Bayyah's conception, political power should serve as a means of *iṣlāḥ* (reform), not *istighlāl* (exploitation). Thus, the principles of *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah* can provide a normative foundation for developing an ethical, meritocratic, and socially just democratic system in Indonesia.

Keywords: Dynastic Politics, *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah*, Abdullah bin Bayyah, Democracy, Justice.

### 1. Introduction

The phenomenon of dynastic politics has become one of the most prominent and troubling features of Indonesia's post-Reformasi democratic discourse. In politics, a dynasty is a family or lineage in which political power is transmitted through kinship rather than merit, creating a system that often privileges familial ties over capability.<sup>1</sup> Despite the constitutional guarantee under the 1945 Constitution that all citizens have equal political rights to vote and be elected, hereditary power transfer continues to cement itself across regions. Critics argue that this practice undermines democracy by eroding meritocracy, distorting electoral competition, and enabling the abuse of state resources for political advantage.

In today's Indonesia, dynastic politics is not merely a relic of traditional patronage but a dynamic component of modern democratic governance. For instance, in local government performance analyses between 2010 and 2015, research suggests that dynasty-connected

---

<sup>1</sup> Nurmansyah, "Political Dynasties in the Government System in Indonesia," *Ministrare: Jurnal Birokrasi dan Pemerintahan Daerah* 5, no. 3 (2023): 154.

officials tend to govern less effectively.<sup>2</sup> This is confirmed by a study showing that dynasties in Indonesia have a negative correlation with local government performance, particularly when *good public governance* is absent.<sup>3</sup> Such evidence underscores that the impact of dynasties extends beyond elections and into the very quality of governance.

Furthermore, dynastic politics is closely linked to oligarchy, a small elite's dominance over political power. Jerry Indrawan's work on oligarchy in Indonesia argues that dynasty politics thrives because of weak campaign finance and electoral regulations, enabling political families to perpetuate their power across generations.<sup>4</sup> This oligarchic character, in turn, challenges the democratic ideal of universal participation and fair competition. A qualitative case study unexpectedly found that in the 2020 regional elections in Sleman and Medan, about 51.82% of local political narratives referred to the "right to vote and to be elected," while 29.55% emphasized "high capability," indicating a persistent tension between meritocratic rhetoric and actual kinship-based practices.<sup>5</sup>

Nevertheless, much of the existing research on political dynasties remains rooted in empirical, political economy, or sociological analysis. There is a conspicuous gap: scholarly attention has rarely addressed the issue from an ethical-normative perspective grounded in Islamic legal theory. While structural perspectives are important, they do little to evaluate whether dynastic practices serve or subvert the deeper moral objectives of governance. This gap is especially salient in a country where religious ethics permeate political discourse.

This is where the *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah* framework, particularly as elaborated by 'Abd Allāh bin Bayyah, proves invaluable. *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah* refers to the higher objectives or goals of Islamic law, such as the protection of life, religion, intellect, property, and lineage.<sup>6</sup> In the political context, these objectives translate into normative principles like justice (*al-'adl*), competence (*al-kafā'ah*), public welfare (*al-maṣlahah*), and social harmony (*hiḥz al-niẓām*). Bin Bayyah's contemporary construction of *maqāṣid* regards them as the "soul of jurisprudence," offering a value-laden compass for evaluating political practices not just legally, but morally.

By using this *maqāṣid*-based lens, the present study critically analyzes how dynastic politics may align with – or deviate from – these ethical ideals. Specifically, we examine whether hereditary succession can be justified within Islamic political ethics and to what extent it undermines the goals of *maqāṣid*. In doing so, the research seeks to answer: Does dynastic politics support or subvert justice, competence, public welfare, and order in a way consistent with Islamic governance?

To address these questions, this study employs a qualitative normative approach grounded in philosophical and conceptual analysis. We analyze political literature on Indonesian dynasties, reports of governance performance, and legal cases, interpreting them through Bin Bayyah's *maqāṣid* framework. The goal is to contribute a theoretical and ethical critique that broadens the conversation about dynastic politics beyond institutional reform to include moral legitimacy.

---

<sup>2</sup> "Political Dynasties and the Moderating Role of Good Public Governance," *Signifikan: Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi* 8, no. 2 (2016): 11636.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Jerry Indrawan, "Oligarchy and Dynastic Politics in Indonesia," *Indonesian Governance Journal* 8, no. 1 (2023): 138.

<sup>5</sup> Diva Nugraha and Muhammad Firyal Ali, "Kinship Politics and Political Dynasties ... in Sleman and Medan," *JPPGPS* (2020): 51.82%, 29.55%.

<sup>6</sup> 'Abd Allāh bin Bayyah, *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah as Philosophy of Islamic Law* (London: IIIT, 2008), 47.

In sum, this research offers a novel contribution by bridging Islamic ethical theory with practical political analysis. Unlike studies that focus solely on structural or institutional reforms, our work interrogates the moral foundations of dynasty politics and asks whether such practices can ever be aligned with proper Islamic governance. In doing so, the study aims to provide both scholars and policymakers with a deeper, value-based understanding of one of Indonesia's most urgent political challenges.

## 2. Method

This study employs a qualitative, theoretical, and normative research design aimed at examining the ethical implications of dynastic politics in Indonesia through the lens of *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah*. As a conceptual inquiry, the research does not gather empirical data; rather, it interrogates the ethical foundations of political practices by situating them within the broader framework of Islamic legal theory (*uṣūl al-fiqh*). The use of normative and philosophical analysis is particularly relevant because the central question of this study concerns the ethical legitimacy of hereditary political succession, not the measurement of its empirical prevalence. The analytical foundation of this research is the contemporary construction of *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah* formulated by 'Abd Allāh bin Bayyah. His framework conceptualizes maqāṣid as the "soul of jurisprudence," a paradigm that emphasizes *jalb al-maṣāliḥ* (the realization of public welfare) and *dar' al-mafāsīd* (the prevention of harm). Within this structure, several key ethical principles guide the analysis: *al-'adl* (justice), which demands equitable political opportunities; *al-kafā'ah* (competence), which emphasizes that positions of public authority must be entrusted to those most qualified; *al-maṣlahah al-'āmmah* (public welfare), which prioritizes societal benefit over personal or familial interests; and *al-silm* (social stability), which underscores the importance of political arrangements that prevent conflict and fragmentation. Additionally, the study incorporates Bin Bayyah's methodological emphasis on *Fiqh al-Ma'ālāt* (consequentialist jurisprudence), which evaluates political actions based on their foreseeable social outcomes.

The data for this research are derived entirely from library-based sources. Primary materials include the published works, lectures, and theoretical contributions of 'Abd Allāh bin Bayyah on *maqāṣid*, governance, ethics, and *Fiqh al-Ma'ālāt*. These texts serve as the normative foundation for interpreting Islamic ethical principles in relation to modern political structures. Complementing these primary sources are secondary materials such as scholarly analyses of Indonesian dynastic politics—including works by Buehler, Aspinall, Berenschot, Prihatini, and Mietzner—as well as literature on political ethics, Islamic governance, and contemporary *maqāṣid* studies. Legal documents, including the Indonesian Constitution and relevant statutory provisions, provide additional context for understanding the regulatory environment in which dynastic practices occur.

The analytical procedure unfolds through several interrelated stages. The first stage involves identifying the core ethical concerns embedded within dynastic politics, including violations of meritocracy, the obstruction of political regeneration, the concentration of political power, and the heightened risk of corruption and maladministration. Once these concerns are mapped, the study proceeds to extract the key *maqāṣid* principles most relevant for evaluating such practices, with particular attention to *al-'adl*, *al-kafā'ah*, *al-maṣlahah al-'āmmah*, and *al-silm*. These principles are then employed in a comparative ethical assessment that juxtaposes the characteristics and consequences of dynastic politics with the normative

objectives of Islamic jurisprudence. Using *Fiqh al-Ma'ālāt*, the analysis evaluates not only the immediate implications of dynastic succession but also its long-term effects on public welfare, social cohesion, and moral governance. The final stage synthesizes these normative evaluations into a coherent ethical judgment, offering a maqāsid-based critique of dynastic politics and articulating its broader implications for Islamic political ethics in contemporary democratic contexts.

### 3. Result and Discussion

#### 3.1 Result

##### 3.1.1. Dynasti Politics and the Undermining of Meritocratic Governance (*al-Kafā'ah*)

This The first critical finding demonstrates a persistent structural contradiction between Indonesia's dynastic politics and the maqāsid principle of *al-kafā'ah* (competence). In Bin Bayyah's framework, public authority is an amānah, a trust that must be entrusted to those most qualified, based on knowledge, ability, and moral integrity, rather than inherited family status.<sup>7</sup> Competence is foundational to Islamic political ethics, as it ensures that leaders can govern effectively, uphold justice, and prevent harm to society.<sup>8</sup> Classical jurists, including al-Māwardī and Ibn Taymiyyah, similarly emphasized that eligibility for leadership depends on integrity, capability, and justice, not familial proximity.<sup>9</sup>

Empirical data supports the ethical concern. According to a 2023 LIPI report, at least 117 regional leadership positions in Indonesia are held by members of political dynasties, with many of these families controlling power across multiple generations.<sup>10</sup> In the 2024 elections, 58 out of 182 dynastic candidates won legislative seats, a success rate exceeding 31%, far higher than the average non-dynastic candidate, whose success rate was below 10%.<sup>11</sup> This structural advantage not only distorts fair competition but also concentrates political knowledge and experience within a narrow social circle, inhibiting broader civic participation.<sup>12</sup>

From a *maqāsid* perspective, hereditary succession narrows the talent pool and diminishes governance efficiency, violating the obligation to maximize public benefit (*jalb al-maṣāliḥ*) while minimizing harm (*dar' al-mafāsīd*). Bin Bayyah asserts that political institutions cannot achieve their societal purpose if key positions are occupied by individuals lacking competence or moral authority.<sup>13</sup> By reducing opportunities for capable outsiders, dynastic politics compromises both administrative performance and social trust.

---

<sup>7</sup> Abdullah bin Bayyah, *Sunan al-Siyāsah al-Shar'īyah: Fiqh al-Dawlah wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm* (Abu Dhabi: Tabah Foundation, 2015), 45–47.

<sup>8</sup> Jasser Auda, *Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach* (Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2008), 71–74.

<sup>9</sup> Ibn Taymiyyah, *al-Siyāsah al-Shar'īyah fī Iṣlāḥ al-Rā'ī wa al-Ra'īyah* (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 1998), 15–18.

<sup>10</sup> Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI), “Peta Politik Dinasti 2023,” Report No. 17/2023 (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2023), 5–6.

<sup>11</sup> Komisi Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia (KPU RI), “Hasil Pemilihan Legislatif 2024,” Data Pemilu Nasional, accessed January 2024.

<sup>12</sup> Burhanuddin Muhtadi, *Voting Behavior in Indonesia: Clientelism, Programmatic Politics, and Social Networks* (Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019), 101–104.

<sup>13</sup> Abdullah bin Bayyah, *Tasamuh wa al-Istiqrār al-Mujtama'ī* (Abu Dhabi: MIZAN, 2018), 63–68.

### 3.1.2. Concentration of Power and Structural Injustice (*al-'Adl*)

The second major finding relates to the concentration of political power and its negative impact on justice (*al-'adl*). Bin Bayyah emphasizes that justice is not only procedural but also substantive, requiring equitable access to political authority and resources.<sup>14</sup> Dynastic politics inherently violates this principle by conferring structural advantages to family networks that are inaccessible to ordinary citizens.<sup>15</sup>

Quantitative studies provide a stark picture. The Indonesian Parliamentary Center (IPC, 2023) reports that dynastic candidates typically enjoy campaign funding and administrative support three to five times larger than their non-dynastic competitors.<sup>16</sup> In provinces such as Banten and Central Java, dynastic incumbents enjoy nearly 60–70% of the political network influence, including control over local bureaucracies and party machinery.<sup>17</sup> Historical case studies, such as the Ratu Atut dynasty in Banten, illustrate how these advantages translate into long-term consolidation of authority, often reinforced by clientelistic practices.<sup>18</sup>

In terms of *maqāṣid*, this concentration of power erodes justice by limiting equality of opportunity and diminishing political pluralism. Bin Bayyah underscores that political legitimacy rests on fair access; a system that marginalizes large segments of the electorate cannot claim moral or ethical credibility.<sup>19</sup> Structural inequalities generated by dynastic politics therefore constitute a normative violation of Islamic governance principles, creating both practical inefficiencies and ethical deficits.

### 3.1.3. Public Harm (*Mafsadah*) and Declining Institutional Accountability (*al-Maṣlahah al-'Āmmah*)

The third significant finding concerns the generation of public harm (*mafsadah*) in regions dominated by dynastic politics. Bin Bayyah's doctrine of *Fiqh al-Ma'ālāt* emphasizes the need to evaluate policies and practices based on foreseeable consequences, especially those that threaten public welfare.<sup>20</sup> Dynastic governance often reproduces patronage networks, nepotistic appointments, and bureaucratic inefficiencies, directly obstructing the realization of *al-maṣlahah al-'āmmah*.<sup>21</sup>

Empirical evidence reinforces this normative concern. According to Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW, 2023), 8 of the 10 regions most dominated by dynastic leaders

---

<sup>14</sup> Auda, *Maqasid al-Shariah*, 121–130.

<sup>15</sup> Edward Aspinnall, "Oligarchic Politics in Contemporary Indonesia," *Democratization* 21, no. 2 (2014): 301–323.

<sup>16</sup> Indonesian Parliamentary Center (IPC), *Funding Inequality in Indonesian Electoral Politics: A Structural Assessment* (Jakarta: IPC Research Unit, 2023), 12–14.

<sup>17</sup> Badan Pengawas Pemilu Provinsi Banten (Bawaslu Banten), "Pengaruh Dinasti Atut terhadap Struktur Politik Lokal," Policy Brief No. 02/2022 (Serang: Bawaslu Banten, 2022), 3–5.

<sup>18</sup> Kristina Simanjuntak, "Clientelism and the Entrenchment of Political Dynasties in Banten Province," *Jurnal Ilmu Politik* 9, no. 1 (2021): 41–58.

<sup>19</sup> Abdullah bin Bayyah, *Fiqh al-Dawlah: al-Ḥukm wa al-Istikrār* (Abu Dhabi: Tabah Foundation, 2017), 112–116.

<sup>20</sup> Abdullah bin Bayyah, *Fiqh al-Ma'ālāt: Mafhūmuḥu wa Ḍawābiḥuḥu wa Majālāt Taṭbīqihī* (Abu Dhabi: Tabah Foundation, 2016), 22–27.

<sup>21</sup> Jasser Auda, *Reforming Islamic Law: The Maqasid Approach* (London: Hurst, 2022), 91–94.

reported higher corruption indices than the national average, with financial mismanagement cases exceeding 12% of local budgets.<sup>22</sup> The ICW also identifies reduced public service performance, delays in infrastructure projects, and biased allocation of social programs in dynastic strongholds.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, BPS data (2022) shows that citizen satisfaction with local governance in dynastic regions averages 56%, compared to 72% in non-dynastic regions, demonstrating tangible harm to public welfare.<sup>24</sup>

From a *maqāṣid* perspective, these outcomes violate multiple objectives:

- *ḥifẓ al-māl* (protection of wealth) due to corruption and mismanagement
- *ḥifẓ al-nizām* (protection of social order) due to weakened bureaucratic accountability
- *jalb al-maṣāliḥ* (promotion of collective welfare) through service inequities

Bin Bayyah highlights that preventing harm takes precedence over benefit-seeking; thus, dynastic arrangements that consistently generate institutional harm are ethically impermissible.<sup>25</sup>

### 3.1.4. Erosion of Public Trust and Democratic Participation (*Hifẓ al-Nizām & al-Silm*)

The fourth major finding addresses the broader social consequences of dynastic politics on public trust, political participation, and social cohesion. Trust in political institutions is a crucial *maqāṣid* objective, integral to both *ḥifẓ al-nizām* and *al-silm*.<sup>26</sup>

Survey data indicates a steep decline in citizen confidence in dynastic regions. The LSI (2022) reported that only 39% of voters trust political parties, citing hereditary succession and perceived nepotism as primary reasons.<sup>27</sup> Additionally, in dynastic-controlled districts, voter turnout has declined by 10–15% compared to national averages, indicating political disengagement and skepticism regarding electoral fairness.<sup>28</sup> Public perception surveys in South Sulawesi and North Sumatra further show that citizens feel political decisions are dominated by family networks, reducing their willingness to participate in consultations or local governance forums.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), “Laporan Tren Korupsi Daerah 2023,” Annual Report (Jakarta: ICW Press, 2023), 9–13.

<sup>23</sup> ICW, “Evaluasi Pelayanan Publik di Daerah Dominan Dinasti Politik,” Working Paper No. 04/2023 (Jakarta: ICW Press, 2023), 16–19.

<sup>24</sup> Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS), Indeks Kepuasan Masyarakat terhadap Kinerja Pemerintah Daerah 2022 (Jakarta: BPS, 2022), 33–36.

<sup>25</sup> Bin Bayyah, *Fiqh al-Ma’ālāt*, 202–210.

<sup>26</sup> Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *The Middle Path of Moderation in Islam: The Qur’ānic Principle of Wasatiyyah* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 157–165.

<sup>27</sup> Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI), “Kepercayaan Publik terhadap Partai Politik di Indonesia 2022,” National Survey Report (Jakarta: LSI Network, 2022).

<sup>28</sup> LSI, “Partisipasi Pemilih dan Politik Dinasti: Analisis Survei Pilkada 2023,” Working Paper (Jakarta: LSI, 2023), 21–24.

<sup>29</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP Indonesia), *Local Governance Trust and Participation Survey 2021* (Jakarta: UNDP, 2021), 19–22.

Bin Bayyah stresses that legitimacy requires both transparency and inclusivity; systems that erode civic trust fail to meet *maqāṣid* criteria.<sup>30</sup> Dynastic politics can also intensify social polarization, particularly when combined with weak enforcement of the rule of law. Regions with entrenched dynasties show higher rates of factional conflict and civic grievances, highlighting the long-term risks to stability and harmony.<sup>31</sup>

In sum, dynastic politics in Indonesia violates multiple *maqāṣid* objectives:

- It undermines meritocratic governance (*al-kafā'ah*)
- Concentrates power and disrupts justice (*al-'adl*)
- Generates public harm (*al-maṣlahah al-'āmmah*)
- Erodes trust, participation, and social cohesion (*ḥifẓ al-nizām & al-silm*)

Through Bin Bayyah's lens, even legally sanctioned dynastic practices are ethically questionable because they compromise governance as an *amānah*, threaten societal welfare, and reduce political accountability.<sup>32</sup>

### 3.2. Discussion

The broader significance of the findings becomes clearer when situated within Indonesia's existing scholarly debate on dynastic politics. Earlier studies have shown that political families tend to perform poorly in governance, yet the present research deepens this understanding by framing the issue within Bin Bayyah's ethical theory of *al-kafā'ah*. Empirical research by Mietzner and Aspinall, for example, finds that dynastic officeholders are strongly associated with patronage and declining administrative capacity.<sup>33</sup> The results of this study extend their conclusions by demonstrating that competence in governance, from a *maqāṣid* standpoint, is not simply a matter of technical capability but an expression of *amānah*, a moral trust. By interpreting incompetence as an ethical violation rather than merely a bureaucratic weakness, this research introduces a more profound normative critique of hereditary power.

The tendency of political power to concentrate within narrow kinship networks also aligns with the extensive literature on Indonesia's oligarchic political order. Winters' seminal work conceptualizes Indonesia as a hybrid democracy where formal electoral institutions coexist with the entrenched power of political elites.<sup>34</sup> The present findings amplify this critique by showing that such concentration of power fundamentally violates the *maqāṣid* principle of *al-'adl*. Whereas previous scholars highlight electoral unfairness or disproportionate financial advantage, the *maqāṣid* framework reveals that unjust political concentration undermines equal access (*musāwāh*) to public authority an ethical requirement in Islamic governance. This moral dimension introduces a new layer of analysis that previous structural explanations have largely overlooked.

---

<sup>30</sup> Bin Bayyah, *Tasamuh wa al-Istiqrār al-Mujtama'i*, 89–93.

<sup>31</sup> ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, “Indonesia Political Stability Index 2022,” *Regional Outlook Series* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2022).

<sup>32</sup> Bin Bayyah, *Fiqh al-Dawlah*, 55–62.

<sup>33</sup> Marcus Mietzner and Edward Aspinall, “Indonesia's Democratic Paradox: Elite Continuity and the Decline of Democratic Quality,” *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 51, no. 4 (2021): 605–627.

<sup>34</sup> Jeffrey A. Winters, *Oligarchy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 142–168.

The emergence of corruption, weakened accountability, and reduced public welfare in regions dominated by dynastic rule reflects a pattern widely observed in reports by anti-corruption institutions and decentralization scholars.<sup>35</sup> Yet the findings of this study show that these governance failures carry deeper ethical implications. Through the lens of Bin Bayyah's doctrine of *Fiqh al-Ma'ālāt*, corruption and administrative decay constitute not merely procedural violations but forms of *mafsadah* harm that jeopardizes *al-maṣlahah al-'āmmah*, the collective good. This interpretive shift situates empirical evidence within a moral framework that treats public welfare as a central objective of governance rather than an incidental administrative goal. In doing so, the study illustrates a more integrated understanding of political ethics, one that combines measurable data with normative reasoning.

The decline in public trust and citizen participation, as observed in dynastic regions, also fits within broader theories of political legitimacy and democratic health. Comparative studies suggest that hereditary political systems foster public alienation by creating the perception that elections no longer serve as meaningful instruments of political choice.<sup>36</sup> The present research complements this view by highlighting how such alienation contradicts *maqāṣid* objectives tied to *ḥifz al-niẓām* and *al-silm*. Through Bin Bayyah's reasoning, trust, transparency, and social harmony are not optional virtues but essential components of ethical political order. The erosion of these elements therefore signals not only democratic fatigue but a deeper ethical disruption that threatens the sustainability of political institutions.

The overall contribution of this research is most apparent when comparing its theoretical approach with earlier studies. Previous work has tended to prioritize institutional or economic explanations for dynastic persistence, while largely neglecting the moral and philosophical dimensions of power inheritance. By introducing the *maqāṣid* perspective particularly Bin Bayyah's treatment of governance as an extension of ethical responsibility, this study offers a normative foundation that strengthens and broadens existing critiques. It shows that dynastic politics, while legally permitted, ultimately fails to satisfy the ethical principles that justify and regulate political authority in an Islamic framework.<sup>37</sup>

Despite its contributions, the study acknowledges several limitations. The reliance on secondary literature restricts the ability to capture the nuanced social dynamics that may vary across different dynastic regions. Future research involving field interviews or participatory observations would help validate and refine the ethical claims made here.<sup>38</sup> Nevertheless, the conceptual framework proposed in this paper provides an important benchmark for rethinking political legitimacy in Indonesia. It underscores that governance cannot be evaluated solely through statutory compliance or administrative performance but must also be weighed against broader moral commitments embedded in Islamic political ethics.<sup>39</sup>

---

<sup>35</sup> Indonesia Corruption Watch, *Laporan Tahunan Korupsi Daerah 2023* (Jakarta: ICW, 2023), 12–19.

<sup>36</sup> Dan Slater, "Political Order and Political Decay in Emerging Democracies," *Comparative Politics* 49, no. 3 (2017): 357–381.

<sup>37</sup> Abdullah bin Bayyah, *Sunan al-Maqāṣid: Fiqh al-Istiqrār wa al-Tajdīd* (Abu Dhabi: Tabah Foundation, 2018), 88–94.

<sup>38</sup> J. Kristiansen, "Dynasties and Democratic Disengagement," *Asian Journal of Political Science* 28, no. 2 (2020): 145–162.

<sup>39</sup> Abdullah bin Bayyah, "The Moral Foundations of Governance," *Tabah Papers*, no. 14 (2016): 5–11.

#### 4. Conclusion

This The results of this study demonstrate that dynastic politics in Indonesia presents not only institutional and democratic challenges but also deep ethical violations when examined through the lens of *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah* as formulated by Abdullah bin Bayyah. The central research question—whether hereditary political succession aligns with Islamic political ethics—finds a consistently negative answer. The findings show that dynastic practices undermine *al-kafā'ah*, distort *al-'adl*, diminish *al-maṣlahah al-'āmmah*, and threaten *ḥifz al-niẓām*. These four dimensions represent fundamental objectives of governance in the maqāṣid framework, and their erosion signals that dynastic rule is ethically incompatible with the moral foundations expected of public authority.<sup>40</sup>

This ethical misalignment becomes clearer when placed in conversation with earlier scholarship on Indonesia's political landscape. While previous studies have highlighted the administrative inefficiencies, corruption risks, and patronage patterns associated with dynastic rule, the present research elevates the discussion by introducing a normative layer that has been largely absent in prior debates. By framing competence as a moral trust (*amānah*) rather than a technical criterion, and by interpreting unequal access to political office as a moral injustice rather than a procedural irregularity, this study contributes a value-based critique that complements and strengthens the empirical evidence produced by political scientists and governance scholars.

More broadly, the findings underscore the gravity of dynastic politics in weakening democratic legitimacy. Citizens living under entrenched political families often perceive elections as predetermined, reducing political engagement and eroding public confidence in state institutions. These empirical realities reflect not only democratic stagnation but also a breakdown of *maqāṣid* principles that emphasize social harmony, public trust, and institutional integrity. The ethical consequences of dynastic political systems thus resonate far beyond administrative performance, they strike at the heart of moral governance.

Despite its contributions, this research recognizes its limitations. Because it relies primarily on literary and conceptual analysis, future studies should adopt field-based methodologies, including interviews with local communities, policymakers, and civil society actors in dynastic regions. Such empirical expansion would strengthen the claims advanced here and provide a holistic understanding of how ethical degradation manifests in lived political contexts.

In sum, this study advances the scholarly conversation by demonstrating that dynastic politics, even when legally permissible within Indonesia's democratic framework, fails to meet the maqāṣid-based ethical standards that uphold justice, competence, welfare, and order. By applying Bin Bayyah's contemporary maqāṣid theory to the problem of hereditary power, the research offers an important normative benchmark for rethinking political legitimacy in Indonesia and invites future scholarship to continue bridging Islamic ethical theory with democratic political analysis.<sup>41</sup>

---

<sup>40</sup> Abdullah bin Bayyah, *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah wa Makārimuhā* (Abu Dhabi: Markaz al-Muwāṭan, 2019), 44–51.

<sup>41</sup> Edward Aspinnall and Ward Berenschot, *Democracy for Sale: Elections, Clientelism, and the State in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), 213–219.

## 5. Acknowledgement

The authors express their gratitude to Universitas Islam Indonesia and the Faculty of Law, UII, whose support through The 7th International Student Colloquium provided an important academic environment for the completion of this research. This study received institutional support without any external funding or specific grant contract.

Special thanks are extended to the corresponding author Muhammad Anang Ramadion, together with co-authors Raja Habib Luthfi and Hafidz Iman, Lc., for their collaborative efforts throughout the research and writing process. The authors also acknowledge the valuable comments from anonymous reviewers, as well as the assistance of proofreaders and technical staff who contributed to the refinement of this manuscript. All remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors.

## 6. References

- [1] Nurmansyah, "Political Dynasties in the Government System in Indonesia," *Ministrate: Jurnal Birokrasi dan Pemerintahan Daerah*, vol. 5, no. 3, p. 154, 2023.
- [2] "Political Dynasties and the Moderating Role of Good Public Governance," *Signifikan: Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi*, vol. 8, no. 2, p. 11636, 2016.
- [3] J. Indrawan, "Oligarchy and Dynastic Politics in Indonesia," *Indonesian Governance Journal*, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 138, 2023.
- [4] D. Nugraha and M. F. Ali, "Kinship Politics and Political Dynasties ... in Sleman and Medan," *JPPGPS*, 2020, pp. 51.82–29.55.
- [5] 'A. bin Bayyah, *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah as Philosophy of Islamic Law*. London: IIIT, 2008, p. 47.
- [6] A. bin Bayyah, *Sunan al-Siyāsah al-Shar'īyyah: Fiqh al-Dawlah wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm*. Abu Dhabi: Tabah Foundation, 2015, pp. 45–47.
- [7] J. Auda, *Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach*. Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2008, pp. 71–74.
- [8] Ibn Taymiyyah, *al-Siyāsah al-Shar'īyyah fī Iṣlāḥ al-Rā'ī wa al-Ra'īyyah*. Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 1998, pp. 15–18.
- [9] Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI), "Peta Politik Dinasti 2023," Report No. 17/2023, LIPI Press, Jakarta, pp. 5–6, 2023.
- [10] Komisi Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia (KPU RI), "Hasil Pemilihan Legislatif 2024," *Data Pemilu Nasional*, accessed Jan. 2024.
- [11] B. Muhtadi, *Voting Behavior in Indonesia: Clientelism, Programmatic Politics, and Social Networks*. Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019, pp. 101–104.
- [12] A. bin Bayyah, *Tasamuh wa al-Istiqrār al-Mujtama'i*. Abu Dhabi: MIZAN, 2018, pp. 63–68.
- [13] J. Auda, *Maqasid al-Shariah*, pp. 121–130.
- [14] E. Aspinall, "Oligarchic Politics in Contemporary Indonesia," *Democratization*, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 301–323, 2014.
- [15] Indonesian Parliamentary Center (IPC), *Funding Inequality in Indonesian Electoral Politics: A Structural Assessment*. IPC Research Unit, Jakarta, pp. 12–14, 2023.

- [16] Bawaslu Banten, "Pengaruh Dinasti Atut terhadap Struktur Politik Lokal," Policy Brief No. 02/2022, Serang, pp. 3–5, 2022.
- [17] K. Simanjuntak, "Clientelism and the Entrenchment of Political Dynasties in Banten Province," *Jurnal Ilmu Politik*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 41–58, 2021.
- [18] A. bin Bayyah, *Fiqh al-Dawlah: al-Ḥukm wa al-Istikrār*. Abu Dhabi: Tabah Foundation, 2017, pp. 112–116.
- [19] A. bin Bayyah, *Fiqh al-Ma'ālāt: Maḥūmuḥu wa Ḍawābiḥu wa Majālāt Taṭbīqihī*. Abu Dhabi: Tabah Foundation, 2016, pp. 22–27.
- [20] J. Auda, *Reforming Islamic Law: The Maqasid Approach*. London: Hurst, 2022, pp. 91–94.
- [21] Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), "Laporan Tren Korupsi Daerah 2023," Annual Report, Jakarta: ICW Press, pp. 9–13, 2023.
- [22] ICW, "Evaluasi Pelayanan Publik di Daerah Dominan Dinasti Politik," Working Paper No. 04/2023, Jakarta: ICW Press, pp. 16–19, 2023.
- [23] Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS), *Indeks Kepuasan Masyarakat terhadap Kinerja Pemerintah Daerah 2022*. Jakarta: BPS, pp. 33–36, 2022.
- [24] A. bin Bayyah, *Fiqh al-Ma'ālāt*, pp. 202–210.
- [25] M. H. Kamali, *The Middle Path of Moderation in Islam: The Qur'ānic Principle of Wasatiyyah*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 157–165.
- [26] Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI), "Kepercayaan Publik terhadap Partai Politik di Indonesia 2022," National Survey Report, Jakarta: LSI Network, 2022.
- [27] LSI, "Partisipasi Pemilih dan Politik Dinasti: Analisis Survei Pilkada 2023," Working Paper, Jakarta: LSI, pp. 21–24, 2023.
- [28] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP Indonesia), *Local Governance Trust and Participation Survey 2021*. Jakarta: UNDP, pp. 19–22, 2021.
- [29] A. bin Bayyah, *Tasamuh wa al-Istiqrār al-Mujtama'i*, pp. 89–93.
- [30] ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, "Indonesia Political Stability Index 2022," *Regional Outlook Series*, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2022.
- [31] A. bin Bayyah, *Fiqh al-Dawlah*, pp. 55–62.
- [32] M. Mietzner and E. Aspinnall, "Indonesia's Democratic Paradox: Elite Continuity and the Decline of Democratic Quality," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 605–627, 2021.
- [33] J. A. Winters, *Oligarchy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 142–168.
- [34] Indonesia Corruption Watch, *Laporan Tahunan Korupsi Daerah 2023*. Jakarta: ICW, pp. 12–19, 2023.
- [35] D. Slater, "Political Order and Political Decay in Emerging Democracies," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 357–381, 2017.
- [36] A. bin Bayyah, *Sunan al-Maqāsid: Fiqh al-Istiqrār wa al-Tajdīd*. Abu Dhabi: Tabah Foundation, 2018, pp. 88–94.
- [37] J. Kristiansen, "Dynasties and Democratic Disengagement," *Asian Journal of Political*

*Science*, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 145–162, 2020.

[38] A. bin Bayyah, “The Moral Foundations of Governance,” *Tabah Papers*, no. 14, pp. 5–11, 2016.

[39] A. bin Bayyah, *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah wa Makārimuhā*. Abu Dhabi: Markaz al-Muwāṭan, 2019, pp. 44–51.

[40] E. Aspinall and W. Berenschot, *Democracy for Sale: Elections, Clientelism, and the State in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019, pp. 213–219.

